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The Status of Recrimination as a Defense
to Divorce Actions in Ohio
T HE DEFENSE OF RECRIMINATION has evolved over a period of
almost two thousand years. It has been defined in various ways,
but the traditional statement avers that where the party seeking a
divorce is guilty of any matrimonial offense for which a divorce may
be granted, that misconduct may be pleaded in bar of the action for
divorce even if the ground relied upon for divorce and the recrimi-
natory offense are not identical.1 With nearly two thousand years
of theory and several hundred years of judicial decisions supporting
the doctrine of recrimination, it has become so firmly entrenched in
the law of divorce that it would appear to be a moot question to
inquire whether this doctrine should be repudiated. Nevertheless, it
is submitted that recrimination, with its basis in the "fault" theory of
divorce,' warrants a critical re-examination and should be either
abolished or at least drastically altered in its practical application!
Not only does recrimination overlook the true considerations of a
divorce action - the utter irreconcilability of the parties involved
as well as child custody, alimony awards, and property settlement -
but also the doctrine's practical effect is to leave the parties in a state
where "married life becomes a penalty for wrongdoing."4 Although
the state may have a valid interest in preserving the family status,
it is highly questionable whether the doctrine of recrimination was
ever intended to operate in such a way as to cause marriage to as-
sume the proportions of a punishment.'
The major focus of this Note will be to: (1) outline the histori-
cal development of recrimination; (2) present a survey of the Ohio
124 AM. JrJR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 226 (1966).
2 Under the fault theory of divorce, the petitioning party wil be granted a divorce
only if he or she is not guilty of a marital offense. Raskin & Katz, The Dying Doctrine
of Recrimination in the United States of America, 35 CAN. B. REV. 1046, 1049 (1957).
3 The defense of recrimination has been widely criticized by legal and sociological
writers as having attained very few positive changes in the law. See, e.g., 2 VERNIER,
AMERIcAN FAMILY LAWs § 78 (1932); Beamer, The Doctrine of Recrimination in
Divorce Proceedings, 10 U. KAN. CITY L REV. 213, 249-54 (1942); Bradway, The
Myth of the Innocent Spouse, 11 TuL. L. REv. 377, 382-87 (1937); Moore, A Critique
of the Recrimination Doctrine, 68 DIcK. L. REv. 157 (1964); Raskin & Katz, supra
note 2, at 1059; Zacharias, Recrimination in the Divorce Law of Illinois, 14 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 217 (1936).
4 Raskin & Katz, supra note 2, at 1049.
5 MADDEN, DOMESIC RELATIONS § 1 (1931).
6 See notes 92-95 infra and accompanying text.
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law of recrimination; and (3) set forth a prospectus for the future
of recrimination in Ohio by pointing out the inherent weaknesses
of the defense as it currently exists.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RECRIMINATION
It is unclear exactly when and how the doctrine of recrimination
first appeared, but several significant stages in its development can
be delineated. Its initial use was probably in Roman law; then it
was incorporated into English law, first, in the ecclesiastical courts
and parliamentary law and later, into the common law; finally, it
was carried over into American law.
A. Recrimination in Roman Law
The doctrine of recrimination had its inception in Roman law
as a method of assuring the wife some interest in property as a
means of support.' Marriage as it existed in Roman law was not
imbued with all the formalities and sacraments of modern mar-
riage.' The type of marriage which became most prevalent was the
matrimonium sine conventione in manum mariti, or free marriage.9
Under free marriage the husband acquired complete control over
his wife's property and could discard his wife with or without rea-
son, without being required to support her. To mitigate the harsh
effects of this practice, the judicial practice of actio rei uxoriae
evolved whereby a wife could recover all of her dowry, with certain
exceptions,"0 within one year after being deserted by her husband. 1
In later times, the Romans were faced with the problem of how to
dispose of the marital property when both husband and wife had
committed marital offenses. In solving this problem they pro-
pounded the curious solution "that equal faults mutually compen-
7 Beamer, supra note 3, at 217.
8 Modern marriage is viewed as a contractual relationship in which both parties have
equal rights. It is founded upon certain religious precepts, and the relationship can be
terminated only with the consent of the state to a divorce or by the death of one of the
parties. MADDm4N op. cit. supra note 5, § 1.
o For an excellent discussion of the historical evolution of the doctrine of recrimina-
tion, see Beamer, supra note 3, at 216-43. For a discussion of Roman law, see id. at
216-19.
1oA husband whose wife had committed adultry was permitted to retain one sixth
of his wife's dowry, but he could retain only one eighth if the wife had committed a
less heinous offense. A husband guilty of adultery had to make immediate restitution of
his wife's dowry; if his wrongdoings were less serious, he had six months to return the
dowry. Id. at 218.
11 Ibid.
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sated for each other, and that neither party should be punished."' 2
Thus, the wife, upon being deserted, would normally be able to re-
gain her dowry within a year, but if her wrongs were so serious as
to destroy her rights to the dowry, she would only be able to retain
the gift made to her at the time of marriage and the husband would
retain her dowry.'" It is interesting to note that none of the above
actions barred divorce where both spouses were guilty of marital
misconduct; rather, they dealt only with the economic aspects of
terminating the marriage."
B. Recrimination Under English Law
(1) Ecclesiastical Law.-The English ecclesiastical courts re-
tained exclusive jurisdiction over divorce from the time of the Nor-
man Conquest until 1857, when a separate Divorce Court was es-
tablished. 5 During this period absolute divorce, as it exists today
was virtually unknown. The only means by which an absolute di-
vorce could be obtained was by an act of Parliament or by death. 6
The only type of divorce granted by the Church courts was a
divorce a mensa et thoro, an order of judicial separation also known
as a divorce from bed and board.' 7 Recrimination appeared as a
defense to divorce actions of this kind, but since the Church courts
were not able to grant absolute divorce, recrimination was used pri-
marily to assure the wife of support rather than to prevent divorce.18
The application of recrimination in ecclesiastical law can be
seen in the famous case of Beeby v. Beeby, 9 where the husband sued
for a divorce a mensa et thoro on the ground of adultery. By way
of recrimination the wife proved misconduct on the part of the hus-
band, including adultery, solicitation of the servants' chastity, and
communication of venereal disease to her. Refusing to compare
the weight of the wrongs committed by the parties, the court me-
12. Ibid.
13 Id. at 219.
14 Raskin & Katz, supra note 2, at 1047.
15 Zacharias, supra note 3, at 219. See generally 1 BISHOP, MARRIAGE & DIVORCE
§§ 4 8- 6 5a (5th ed. 1873); 1 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 621-25
(1923); 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 392-96 (2d ed. repr.
1952); RADiN, ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY § 269 (1936); Beamer, supra note
3, at 222-29.
16 RADIN, op. cit. supra oote 15, § 269.
17 Ibid. The only matrimonial offense relied upon at this time was adultery. See,
e.g., Beeby v. Beeby, 1 Haag. Ecc. 789, 162 Eng. Rep. 755 (Cons. 1799).
18 Beamer, supra note 3, at 228.
'9 1 Hagg. Ecc. 789, 162 Eng. Rep. 755 (Cons. 1799).
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chanically denied a divorce, reasoning that "if he, who has first
violated his marriage vow, should be barred of his remedy: the
parties may live together, and find sources of mutual forgiveness
in the humiliation of mutual guilt. 2
(2) English Common Law.-The most significant develop-
ment in the English doctrine of recrimination occurred in 1857, with
the enactment of the Matrimonial Causes Act2' which brought
matrimonial matters within the province of the remainder of the
English judicial system, thereby initiating the practice of leaving
it to the discretion of the judge whether or not to grant a divorce
when a recriminatory defense was proven."8
(3) Current English Law.--The firm installation of the doc-
trine of judicial discretion in divorce actions has done much to miti-
gate the harsh effects of recrimination in modern English divorce
law.24 At the outset trial judges took a very stringent view of their
authority in cases involving recrimination and were reluctant to
grant a divorce when mutual fault was found. However, by 1942
it had become the exception not to exercise discretion, and a decree
was granted unless there was a good reason for its refusal.25
In Blunt v. Blunt,26 the House of Lords set forth five factors to
govern the courts in their exercise of discretion: (1) the welfare
of any children of the marriage; (2) the interest of the party with
whom the petitioner has been guilty of misconduct, having special
regard to the prospect of their future marriage; (3) the question
of whether there is a prospect of reconciliation; (4) the desirability
of allowing the petitioner to remarry, should he so desire; and
(5) the interest of the community at large, to be judged by drawing
a balance between respect for the binding sanctity of marriage and
2 0 Id. at 790, 162 Eng. Rep. at 755.
2120 & 21 Vict. c. 85, §§ 2, 3 & 6.
22 After passage of the act, the ecclesiastical courts ceased to function as a separate
entity, and divorces were entertained in the regular law courts, specifically, the new
Divorce Court.
2 3 Bradway, supra note 3, at 380 n.12. For a survey of the developments of recrim-
ination at common law, see Beamer, supra note 3, at 230-40.
24 This discretion - whether or not to grant a divorce - was recognized by statute
in 1937. The Matrimonial Causes Act, 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, c. 57, § 4. This section
reads in part: "The court shall not be bound to pronounce a decree of divorce ...." The
English judges now weigh several factors, enumerated in text accompanying notes 26-27
infra, in determining whether or not a divorce will be granted despite the existence of
a recriminatory offense. Therefore, in English law proof of recrimination no longer
ensures an automatic denial of divorce.
25 See Blunt v. Blunt, [1943] A.C. 517, 520.
26 [19431 A.C. 517.
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the social considerations which make it contrary to public policy to
insist on the maintenance of a union which has utterly broken
down."7 The first four factors had all been espoused in an earlier
case,2" but the Blunt court added the fifth which it considered to
be of primary importance. Basically, this factor involves a weigh-
ing of the community's interest - whether this interest is best
served by permitting the dissolution of an irreparably injured mar-
riage or by insisting upon its maintenance merely because a recrimi-
natory defense has been pleaded and proved.
With the evolution of this community interest factor, the Eng-
lish divorce courts have manifested a desire to inject reason into the
recriminatory divorce cases in place of bare conscience and emotion.
The trend toward exercising judicial discretion to grant divorces
even though a valid recriminatory defense may exist has continued
in present English law2
C. Recrimination in American Law
The application of recrimination in this country assumed quite
different dimensions from that of England, since the ecclesiastical
courts were never established here."9  Absolute divorce, totally un-
known in the ecclesiastical courts, gained recognition in the United
States,"' thus casting the defense of recrimination in a new light.
For purposes of discussion the statutes of the thirty-one states
which authorize the defense can be classified into four different
groups: (1) the absolute bar states,"2 wherein any pleaded and
2 7 1d. at 525.
2 8 Wilson v. Wilson, [1920] P. 20.
2 9 See, e.g., Redman v. Redman, [1948] 1 All E.R. 333 (C.A.), wherein the court
felt that the exceptional circumstances of the case, the history of the marriage, and the
husband's absence for several years, contributing to the wife's bigamy, indicated that the
interest of the community at large (the Blunt criterion) would be best served by giving
a divorce to the wife so she could remarry and by granting the husband a divorce so he
could marry the woman who had borne his illegitimate child.
See also Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, c. 25, § 4(2), wherein judicial
discretion is retained, and Anstey v. Anstey & Hartford, [1962] 1 All ELR. 741 (CA.),
where it was decreed that judicial discretion was or was not to be exercised after con-
sideration of the case as a whole rather than by a piecemeal consideration of the various
matrimonial offenses.
30 For a more thorough examination of early American law, see I BISHOP, op. cit.
supra note 15, §§ 66-86; Beamer, supra note 3, at 241-43.
a' Id. at 243.
32 In eleven states any recriminatory offense serves as an absolute bar to divorce:
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1209 (1947); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 111, 122; GA. CODE ANN.
§ 30-109 (1952); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 324-26 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. 55 32-
611, -613 (1963); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.90 (1957); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
[Vol. 18: 13301334
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proven matrimonial misconduct of the petitioner sufficient to con-
stitute a ground for divorce will serve as an absolute bar to the
granting of a divorce; (2) states where adultery is the only recrimi-
natory defense, and it can be asserted only when the divorce ground
upon which the petitioner is relying is also adultery; 3 (3) the dis-
cretionary states" - those which permit the exercise of judicial
discretion to grant a divorce, even though both parties have been
guilty of misconduct constituting grounds for divorce; and (4) states
which recognize by statute the doctrine of comparative rectitude 5
whereby if both parties are guilty, a divorce may be granted to
the party who has committed the less serious offense.
In addition to the states with some form of statutory recrimina-
tion, there are fifteen states which recognize recrimination as a part
§§ 21-118, -128 (1955); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-304 (1960); S.D. CODE §§ 14.0713,
.0718 (1939); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 20-55 (1957).
Although the California and Georgia statutes are by their terms absolute, their ap-
plication by judicial decision appears to lie within the discretion of the judge. See De-
Burgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952); Lowry v. Lowry, 170 Ga.
349, 153 S.E. 11 (1930).
33 There are sixteen states where adultery is a recriminatory defense to divorce ac-
tions based upon adultery. In some of these states, the statutes read that recrimination
wil operate to deny a divorce where the offenses are of "like kind." See ALA. CODE
tit. 34, § 26 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.180 (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-313 (1956); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1528 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 65.04
(1949); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 11 (Smith-Hurd 1956); IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1202
(1946); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 691 (1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.030
(1952); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-7 (1952); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 171; ORE. REV.
STAT. § 107.070 (1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 52 (1955); TEN. CODE ANN.
5 36-811 (1955); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4630 (1960); W. VA. CODE ANN.
54714 (1961).
In New Jersey the statute has been held not to be exclusive; that is, it does not nul-
lify the unwritten law of recrimination. Thus, New Jersey actually appears to be an
"absolute bar' state. See Huster v. Huster, 64 N.J. Super. 29, 165 A.2d 305 (Super.
Ct. 1960).
34 There are only two states which by statute permit the exercise of judicial discre-
tion to determine whether or not the defense of recrimination will be invoked to deny
a divorce. These statutes are an attempt to erode the pernicious effects of recrimination
as an absolute defense. See MINN. STAT. § 518.06(9) (Supp. 1966); Mss. CODE
ANN. § 2735.5 (Supp. 1964). Compare MINN. STAT. § 518.08(4) (1947), which
still recognizes recrimination for the offense of adultery by providing that the court may
deny a divorce in such cases. Also, as discussed, supra note 32, the courts of California
and Georgia seem to have interpreted their statutes as permitting the exercise of ju-
dicial discretion. In addition, Florida, whose statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 65-04 (1949),
declares that a divorce shall be denied where both parties are guilty of adultery, has
interpreted recrimination to be only a discretionary defense. See Stewart v. Stewart,
158 Fla. 326, 29 So. 2d 247 (1946).
35The doctrine of comparative rectitude exists by statute in only three states: KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-1606 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.120 (1957); and Wis. STAT.
§ 247.101 (Supp. 1966). The Wisconsin courts are authorized only to grant a "legal
separation to the party whose equities on the whole are found to be superior," but a
legal separation for a period of years is a ground for divorce in that state.
19671 1335
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18: 1330
of their common law;86 among this group is Ohio. The defense of
recrimination has been dearly repudiated in only four states."1 With
this outline of the law of other jurisdictions in mind, 8 it is now
appropriate to consider the defense of recrimination as it exists in
Ohio.
II. RECRIMINATION AS A DEFENSE IN OHIO
Generally, there are three situations in which the defense of re-
crimination will be applied: (1) where the petitioner has unclean
hands; (2) where there has been a breach of mutually dependent
covenants; and (3) where the parties are in pari delicto,"9 that is,
where both parties are guilty of matrimonial misconduct.4 ° The
courts have exhibited a trend toward mechanical application of these
rules; accordingly, one writer asserts that they are "merely rationali-
zations of a result already reached."4 1  All of these have been
"
0 The fifteen states which apply recrimination as a part of their common law, and
representative decisions thereof, include: Paris v. Paris, 18 Conn. Supp. 311 (Super. Ct.
1953); Nichols v. Nichols, 133 N.W.2d 77 (Iowa 1965); Minnis v. Minnis, 312 S.W.-
2d 903 (Ky. Ct. App. 1958); Eals v. Swan, 221 La. 330, 59 So. 2d 409 (1952); Green
v. Green, 125 Md. 141, 93 Ad. 400 (1915); Reddington v. Reddington, 317 Mass.
760, 59 N.E.2d 775 (1945); Bailey v. Bailey, 67 N.H. 402, 29 Ad. 847 (1892); Pharr
v. Pharr, 223 N.C. 115, 25 S.E.2d 471 (1943); Opperman v. Opperman, 77 Ohio App.
69, 65 N.E.2d 655 (1945); Church v. Church, 16 R.I. 667, 19 Ad. 244 (1890); Jef-
fords v. Jeffords, 216 S.C. 451, 58 S.E.2d 731 (1950); Hartwell v. Hartwell, 25 Utah
42, 69 Pac. 265 (1902). But see Hendricks v. Hendricks, 123 Utah 178, 257 P.2d
366 (1953), wherein the court condemned the application of recrimination as an abso-
lute bar, the position previously followed by the state of Utah. But see also Tillison v.
Tillison, 63 Vt. 411, 22 Ad. 531 (1891); Haskins v. Haskins, 188 Va. 525, 50 S.E.2d
437 (1948); Metcalf v. Metcalf, 57 Wash. 2d 612, 358 P.2d 983 (1961).
37 These states are Colorado, North Dakota, New Mexico, and Oklahoma. Although
CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-4(3) (1963), provides that a divorce may be granted
to either or both of equally guilty parties, the state supreme court has construed this to
mean that recrimination is no longer a part of the law of Colorado. See Schrader v.
Schrader, 400 P.2d 675 (Colo. 1965). Although North Dakota has repealed its re-
crimination laws (N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 127, §§ 1, 2 (1963)), it is not entirely dear
whether the defense has ceased to operate at common law.
New Mexico has dearly repudiated recrimination by judicial decision: Pavletich v.
Pavletich, 50 N.M. 224, 174 P.2d 826 (1946). Finally, Oklahoma amended a statute
(OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1275 (1961)) in 1955, which has been construed to
abolish all statutory defenses to divorce in that state. See White v. White, 281 P.2d
745 (Okla. 1955).
8 With regard to the status of recrimination in all the states, see generally 2 VER-
NIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 5 78 (1932); Beamer, supra note 3, at 244-48; Moore,
supra note 3; Comment, 41 CALIF. L. Rnv. 320 (1953).
39 Parties are in pari delicto when they are both at fault or guilty of wrongdoing.
BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
40 Beamer, supra note 3, at 215. See also Note, The "Reasons" for the Doctrine of
Recrimination, 26 COLu . L. REv. 83 (1926).
41 Beamer, supra note 3, at 215.
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espoused at one time or another by the Ohio courts in the evolution
of recrimination to its present status.2
A. Substance of the Ohio Law of Recrimination
At this time it is dear that a proven recriminatory offense oper-
ates as an absolute bar to the granting of a divorce in Ohio to either
party. Ohio's divorce statute currently propounds ten grounds for
divorce, including, in addition to the usual fault grounds, three
grounds which are also annulment grounds unassociated with the
notion of fault.4 With the exception of these three annulment
grounds, any matrimonial misconduct which constitutes a ground
for divorce may be pleaded and proven by way of recrimination
against any one of the grounds relied upon in the divorce petition.
(1) Rejection in Ohio of the Doctrine of Comparative Recti-
tude.-The theory underlying the doctrine of comparative rectitude
is that although both parties in a divorce action are guilty of marital
misconduct, the divorce should not be denied automatically for that
reason alone. Instead, the comparative seriousness of the offenses
should be measured, and where the gravity of the offenses is grossly
disparate, a divorce should be granted to the spouse who has com-
mitted the lesser offense." Although this doctrine has been adopted
in some jurisdictions as a method of mitigating the harsh effects of
recrimination, " the Ohio courts have thus far remained unalterably
opposed to the use of comparative rectitude in any form. The classic
statement of the Ohio view appears in the case of Veler v. Veler,46
42 See, e.g., Flatter v. Flatter, 130 N.E.2d 145 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954) (unclean
hands); Opperman v. Opperman, 77 Ohio App. 69, 65 N.E.2d 655 (1945) (breach
of mutual and dependent covenants); Karpanry v. Karpanty, 39 Ohio App. 194, 177
N.E. 521 (1926) (divorce is a remedy for the innocent spouse only); Mattox v. Mat-
tox, 2 Ohio 234 (1826) (parties in pari delicto).
4 3 OMo REV. CODE § 3105.01 permits divorce upon proof of any of the following
grounds:
(a) either party had a husband or wife living at the time of the marriage
from which the divorce is sought; (b) willful absence of the adverse party for
one year; (c) adultery; (d) impotency; (e) extreme cruelty; (f) fradulent
contract;, (g) any gross neglect of duty; (h) habitual drunkenness; (i) im-
prisonment of the adverse party in a state or federal penal institution under
sentence thereto at the time of filing the petition; (j) procurement of a divorce
outside the state, by a husband or wife, by virtue of which the party who pro-
cured it is released from the obligations of the marriage while such obligations
remain binding upon the other party.
Grounds (a), (d), and (f) are also annulment grounds. Cf. Omo Ruv. CODE
3105.31.
44 See Moore, supra note 3, at 166-67.
45 See statutes cited note 35 supra.
6 57 Ohio App. 155, 12 N.E.2d 783 (1935). Accord, Sandrene v. Sandrene, 121
19671 1337
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
wherein a court of appeals denied a divorce to either spouse, affirm-
ing the lower court's finding that each party was guilty of acts of
extreme cruelty."7 In the course of its opinion, the court stated:
The question of comparative guilt cannot enter into the granting
of divorces by the courts. A court can not find both parties guilty
of acts of misconduct constituting a ground for divorce and then
grant a divorce to the party the less guilty of the two. One party
must be guilty and the other innocent of acts constituting a ground
for divorce, before a court can enter a decree.48
It has been asserted that the refusal rests upon "logic."49 How-
ever, is it truly logical to base an automatic denial of divorce upon
an effect, without the slightest consideration of the cause? In cases
where comparative rectitude could be applied for the best interests
of all involved, the Ohio courts see only two guilty parties and are
blind to the fact that the guilt may be of varying degree and that
the cause of the mutual guilt might lie in the unfortunate joinder
of two irreconcilable individuals. Would it not be more consonant
with the goals of marriage to attempt to ameliorate the situation by
granting a divorce rather than by conjuring up "logical" rationaliza-
tions for leaving the parties in the unhappy state in which they are
found?
(2) Refusal To Recognize Judicial Discretion in Ohio Re-
crimination Cases.-In some states the defense of recrimination has
been severely limited by invoking judicial discretion in divorce
cases."0 Succinctly stated, the concept allows a trial judge, when
faced with a divorce case involving recrimination, to weigh all of
the factors involved and grant a divorce, notwithstanding the proven
recriminatory offense, if he believes that the interests of the individ-
uals and society in general will best be served."1
The use of judicial discretion has generally evolved in one of
two ways - either by a clear statutory grant of such discretion52 or
by judicial decision that a proper interpretation of the law of re-
N.E.2d 324 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952); Keath v. Keath, 78 Ohio App. 517, 71 N.E.2d 520
(1946).
47 57 Ohio App. at 155, 12 N.E.2d at 784.
4 8 1d. at 156, 12 N.E.2d at 784.
49 See Keath v. Keath, 78 Ohio App. 517, 71 N.E.2d 520 (1946), where the court
states, in typical language: "Logic cannot permit the weighing of the quantum of guilt
and award the divorce to the one less guilty, for to do so would repudiate the principle
that divorce is a remedy provided for the innocent." Id. at 520, 71 N.E.2d at 522.
50 See note 34 supra.
51 See 24 AM. JrR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 227 (1966).
52 See statutes cited note 34 supra.
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crimination (either as it exists at common law or by statute) "neces-
sarily" calls for such discretion." The latter method of exercising
judicial discretion has sometimes been assailed as involving an ero-
sion of the legislative function.54 However, the counterargument is
that perhaps this judicial "venture" will encourage legislatures to
modernize the divorce laws in light of modern social realities.
The concept of judicial discretion has not been accepted in Ohio
recrimination cases. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether the Ohio
judiciary has repudiated the concept or has merely ignored its ex-
istence, since there is no mention of it in a rather substantial body
of case law, with one exception - Flatter v. Flatter.55
In Flatter, the plaintiff wife sued for divorce on the grounds of
gross neglect of duty and extreme cruelty. By way of recrimination
the defendant husband alleged the same offenses. The trial court
invoked its "discretion," which was affirmed on appeal and in-
terpreted the facts so that it was able to grant the divorce, conclud-
ing that the plaintiff had not committed offenses sufficient to con-
stitute a ground for divorce.5" In reaching its result the court did
not even consider such realistic factors as the probability of recon-
ciliation or the interests of children involved; rather, it relied on a
strained interpretation of the facts of the case. This kind of rea-
soning not only misplaces the emphasis of judicial discretion in
recrimination cases but it also destroys the benefits of the concept.
By applying judicial discretion to the facts of a case, the granting
or denying of a divorce in recrimination cases becomes arbitrary and
is based, more or less, upon judicial whim. This result flies directly
in the face of the reasoning behind the use of judicial discretion,
for it was hoped that, by employing discretion, rational standards
would be introduced which could be used to determine whether or
not a divorce should be granted notwithstanding the proof of a
recriminatory offense.5" It is hoped that if the Ohio courts adopt
the doctrine of judicial discretion as a limitation on recrimination,
they will base its application upon the realistic rational factors rather
than upon a strained interpretation of a given fact situation.
(3) The "Clean Hands" Doctrine in Ohio Recrimination Cases.
-The maxim "He who comes into equity must come with clean
5 3 See, e.g., DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952).
54 See Sherman, The Doctrine of Recrimination in Mfassachasetts (Recrimination
Rejected), 33 B.U.L. REV. 454, 470 (1953).
5 130 N.E.2d 145 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954).
56 Id. at 147.
5724 AM. JuR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 227 (1966).
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hands," as it applies to divorce actions, means that a petitioner who
has himself been guilty of misconduct sufficient to constitute a
ground for divorce cannot invoke the aid of the court to obtain a
divorce, since he is not free of guilt. A problem which has plagued
the courts in the administration of this maxim is whether or not a
divorce court is endowed with full equity powers, since divorce is
purely a creature of statute.58 If this question is answered in the
negative - that is, that a divorce court does not have full equity
powers - then the logical conclusion would be that it lacks the
power to apply the dean hands maxim.
In addressing themselves to this issue the Ohio courts have
"gone the full cycle." In the early Ohio cases where recrimination
appeared as a defense in divorce actions, the courts automatically
applied the clean hands maxim to deny a divorce to an errant peti-
tioner. 9 Then, around the turn of the century, it was decided that
divorce courts did not possess general equity jurisdiction, and there-
fore the clean hands principle was discarded.6" Today, there has
been a resurgence of the maxim, and currently it is firmly entrenched
in Ohio divorce law.6'
Illustrative of the early view is the case of Mattox v. Mattox,62
where a divorce was denied because both spouses were proven guilty
of adultery. In Mattox, the court found that application of the
maxim was within its equitable jurisdiction and held that since the
plaintiff did not have clean hands and the parties were in pari de-
licto, it would be offering a bounty to guilt if relief were granted
to either party.6" At this time it had not yet been questioned
whether a divorce court might not have the authority to invoke
such a principle.
In the early twentieth century, the Ohio Supreme Court con-
568 The equitable concept of "dean hands" had its origin in the English equity court,
the High Court of Chancery. It is interesting to note that at the time this maxim was
propounded, the High Court of Chancery had no jurisdiction in divorce matters, since
these matters were still within the exclusive province of the ecclesiastical courts at that
time. Therefore, it has been urged that application of this equitable precept to divorce
law is erroneous, as the High Chancery Court had no authority in this area when the
maxim was originally propounded. In support of this thesis, see Zacharias, Recrimina-
tion in the Divorce Law of Illinois, 14 CHI.-KENT. L REV. 217, 220-21 (1936). Pro-
fessor Zacharias believes that the foundation of recrimination is closer to the civil law
doctrine of compensation or set-off than to any equitable principle. Id. at 221 n.25.
59 See notes 62-63 infra and accompanying text.
60 See notes 64-72 infra and accompanying text.
61 See notes 73-75 infra and accompanying text.
622 Ohio 234 (1826).
63 Ibid.
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duded that the state courts did not have general equity jurisdiction
in divorce and alimony matters.6" In DeWitt v. DeWitt,65 the su-
preme court propounded some general rules regarding the extent
of a divorce court's equity jurisdiction. The court reasoned that
since the American courts inherited the common law rules of di-
vorce as administered by the English ecclesiastical courts and since
the ecclesiastical courts never had had equity jurisdiction but fol-
lowed only the canon law, the divorce courts of this country should
not have general equity jurisdiction."6
Notwithstanding the supreme court's pronouncement in the De-
Witt case, the Ohio courts struggled to prevent a total commitment
to the view. An example of this obduracy was the decision in Phil-
lips v. Phillips,7 where the court felt it had a limited jurisdiction
in equity, at least to the extent of determining whether a petitioner
for divorce had dean hands." The Phillips decision served to illus-
trate further that the doctrine of recrimination and its concomitant
dean hands maxim were still firmly embedded in Ohio law and
were not to be eroded by one judicial decision.
In Opperman v. Opparman,69 a leading case on the subject
of recrimination in Ohio, the court noted a paradoxical situation,
namely that the dean hands maxim had persisted despite the pro-
nouncement of the DeWitt case.7" The Opperman court adhered
to the DeWitt rule that application of the dean hands maxim was
inappropriate by a divorce court.71 However, the court indicated
that it would be possible to obtain the same result (retaining re-
crimination as an absolute bar) by taking a different tack - one
depending on the theory of a breach of mutually dependent cove-
nants rather than on the theory of clean hands:
[I]t would seem that so far as this state is concerned the enforce-
ment of such 'doctrine [recrimination] by the courts of this state
rationally rests on the concept that he who seeks redress for the
violation of contract resting on mutual and dependent covenants
must himself have performed the obligation on his part, rather
than on the equitable maxim of "dean hands. ' 72
64 DeWitt v. DeWitt, 67 Ohio St. 340, 350, 66 N.E. 136, 139 (1902).
05 Ibid.
Gold. at 344-45, 66 N.E. at 137.
6748 Ohio App. 322, 193 N.E. 657 (1933).
(8 Id. at 324, 193 N. at 658.
69 77 Ohio App. 69, 65 N.E.2d 655 (1945).
70 Id. at 73, 65 N.E.2d at 657.
7 1 Id. at 74-75, 65 N.E.2d at 658.
72 Ibid.
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After a continuing debate of almost fifty years on the question
of whether or not divorce courts had the general equitable jurisdic-
tion empowering them to invoke the clean hands maxim, the issue
was settled by the General Assembly's 1951 amendment to the
Ohio Revised Code.73 Because the amendment permits the exercise
of full equity powers by a trial court when acting upon domestic
relations matters, it was quickly seized upon as a legislative endorse-
ment of general equity jurisdiction for divorce courts.74
Thus it would seem that the dean hands maxim has been un-
equivocally reinstated into the law of recrimination.75 Currently,
the Ohio courts are firmly committed to this principle, and its appli-
cation becomes automatic when proof of a recriminatory offense is
given. This is unfortunate because, used in this manner, the maxim
becomes a limiting factor whereby the practical effect of its invoca-
tion is to exclude totally a consideration of any other equities which
might be present in a given case. A more logical use would allow
the maxim to bar a divorce only in those cases where it appears that
the marriage can be saved and the parties could benefit by having
their marriage preserved.
B. Procedural Aspects of Recrimination in Ohio
A general procedural rule of recrimination, followed in the ma-
jority of American jurisdictions, including Ohio, is that recrimina-
tion is an affirmative defense and must be specifically pleaded.76
However, the courts of Ohio have relaxed this supposedly stringent
rule in the interests of furthering the application of recrimination.
In Sandrene v. Sandrene,77 the court entertained the defense even
though it was not specifically pleaded. Although the petition and
the cross-petition did not plead facts sufficient to charge recrimin-
7- OHIo REV. CODE § 3105.20 reads in part: "In any matter concerning domestic
relations, the court shall not be deemed to be deprived of its full equity powers and
jurisdiction."
74 See Clark v. Clark, 165 Ohio St. 457, 458-59, 136 N.E.2d 52, 54 (1956).
75 See, e.g., Griste v. Griste, 171 Ohio St. 160, 167 N.E.2d 924 (1960); Nelson v.
Nelson, 108 Ohio App. 365, 154 N.E.2d 653 (1958); Lewis v. Lewis, 103 Ohio App.
129, 144 N.E.2d 887 (1956). But cf. Haynie v. Haynie, 169 Ohio St. 467, 159 N.E.2d
765 (1959), where the court asserted that there must be a statutory basis upon which
to exercise the full equity powers granted by § 3105.20 of the Ohio Revised Code be-
fore those powers may be put into play. Id. at 469, 159 N.E.2d at 767. Under this
latter holding, it is at least arguable that since recrimination and the dean hands doctrine
do not exist by virtue of statute, they should not be deemed to be a part of the "full
equity powers" granted by this section.
7 6 Opperman v. Opperman, 77 Ohio App. 69, 74, 65 N.E.2d 655, 658 (1945).
77 121 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952).
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ation as an affirmative defense, the court held that if sufficient facts
were pleaded to state a cause of action for divorce and if those facts
were proven, then the trial court could apply the defense.78
The law is dear in most states, as it is in Ohio, that the recrim-
inatory offense may occur subsequent to the respondent's wrongful
acts which gave rise to the petitioner's suit and that the petitioner's
offenses will still serve as a complete bar to divorce." In addition,
it seems that in many jurisdictions, even though the petitioner's
recriminatory offense occurs after the commencement of the di-
vorce action, the petitioner will still be barred by his misconduct
from securing a divorce.8"
In light of the above, the procedural law of recrimination in
Ohio does not differ significantly from that of any other state where
recrimination exists as an absolute bar to divorce. It merely ap-
pears that the courts work diligently to invoke the doctrine where
applicable and that they are sometimes willing to gloss over pro-
cedural irregularities.
III. FuTuRE OF RECRIMINATION IN OHIO
In view of the current status of recrimination in Ohio, one could
reasonably conclude that the doctrine will continue in this state.
There is, however, a movement afoot for Ohio to amend its policy
on recrimination so as to attune it to the realities of present society.
A. A Legislative Proposal To Limit the Application of
Recrimination
On September 9, 1966, the Family Law Committee of the Ohio
State Bar Association proposed that the General Assembly adopt an
additional ground for divorce - voluntary separation for a period
of two years.81 This proposal appeared in the form of a suggested
78 Id. at 325.
79 See Karpanty v. Karpanty, 39 Ohio App. 194, 177 NE. 521 (1926).
80 See, e.g., Rowell v. Rowell, 209 Ga. 572, 74 S.E.2d 833 (1953). See also 24
AM. JuR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 233 (1966). The law in Ohio is unclear on
this point, but in light of Karpanty v. Karpanty, 39 Ohio App. 194, 177 N.E. 521
(1926), it is at least arguable that this rule would also prevail in Ohio. In Karpanty,
the husband sued for divorce on the ground of gross neglect of duty. The wife pleaded
and proved adultery on the part of the husband subsequent to her condonation of prior
adulterous acts, and the defense of recrimination was invoked to deny the divorce. It
is not clear from the opinion, however, whether the petitioner's recriminatory offenses
occurred before or after commencement of the divorce action.
8139 OHIo B.J. 1200-03 (Oct. 24, 1966).
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amendment to section 3105.01 of Ohio Revised Code,"2 which
would permit a divorce to be granted:
(K) On the application of either party if and when the husband
and wife have lived separate and apart without any cohabitation
for two years. A plea of res judicata or of recrimination with
respect to any provision of this section [3105.01(a)-(j)] shall
not be a bar to either party obtaining a divorce on this ground;
such separation being beyond any possibility of reconciliation.sa
This proposal has been submitted to the Council of Delegates
of the Ohio State Bar Association and, if endorsed by them, will be
submitted to the legislature with the Council's approval and recom-
mendation for adoption.84 The Family Law Committee has set
forth a number of reasons favoring the adoption of such legisla-
tion. Among these are: (1) the realistic belief that a couple living
apart for a number of years is divorced in fact, if not in law; (2)
the belief that it is neither reasonable nor practical to require a party
to be free from fault as a condition precedent to the granting of a
divorce; (3) the hope that the living apart ground will salvage the
beneficial aspect of recrimination - permitting the parties to re-
main married where there is a hope for reconciliation - while
eliminating the objectionable aspect - forcing the parties to re-
main married when they are utterly beyond reconciliation; and (4)
the acknowledgment that living apart for a period of years has now
been incorporated into the grounds for divorce statutes of twenty-
five states.8 5
Where a living-apart ground for divorce has been enacted, the
practical effect of its operation has been to eliminate entirely or to
restrict seriously the fault concept of divorce as it exists under the
doctrine of recrimination. 6 By discarding the fault concept, the
Ohio courts could take a more realistic and rational view of divorce.
Also, it has been alleged that a living-apart ground for divorce
would correct many of the abuses and corruptions that currently
exist in divorce actions and thereby help restore respect for law
and the judiciary. 7 This latter point is illustrated by the current
82 This section is set forth supra note 43.
8 39 Omo B.J. 1201 (Oct. 24, 1966).
84 At a meeting of the Council of Delegates of the Ohio State Bar Association on
November 12, 1966, the recommendation of the Family Law Committee that OHio REV.
CODE § 3105.01 be amended to include a living-apart ground for divorce was tabled.
See 39 Om-o B.J. 1363, 1364 (Nov. 28, 1966).
85 39 OHio B.J. 1201, 1203 (Oct. 24, 1966).
86 Note, 51 IowA L. REv. 184, 191 (1965).
87 39 OHIo B.J. 1201, 1203 (Oct. 24, 1966).
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state of affairs wherein by agreement a recriminatory offense will
often be concealed in order that the parties may obtain a divorce."8
One socio-legal study, conducted in Wisconsin showed that a plain-
tiff's marital misconduct was pleaded in less than ten percent of the
divorce cases studied; whereas mutual fault was found to exist in
over ninety percent of the cases examined. 9 This fact led the in-
vestigators to conclude that there is a vast discrepancy between the
law of recrimination as it exists in theory and the law of recrimina-
tion as it is administered by the courts.9"
Should this living-apart ground for divorce be enacted by the
Ohio General Assembly, it would seem that the fault concept would
become irrelevant and that therefore more of the true facts would
be evinced in a divorce action. It has been said of the living-apart
statutes:
In enacting the voluntary separation statutes, legislatures have cre-
ated a ground for divorce that is consensual rather than culpatory,
and have therefore withdrawn from the courts the power to con-
sider a recrimination defense in an action for divorce to which
such a statute applies. Since voluntary separation as a grounds
for divorce is not concerned with the fault of the parties, recrimin-
ation, which is based entirely on mutual fault, should not be ap-
plicable. The statutes are therefore said to manifest a legislative
intent to permit a marriage relationship which has terminated in
fact to be terminated in law as well91
B. Inherent Weaknesses of Recrimination in its Present Form
There are three primary sodal justifications generally advanced
to support the doctrine of recrimination: (1) it tends to hold the
88 Feinsinger & Young, Recrimination and Related Doctrines in the Wisconsin Law
of Divorce as Administered in Dane County, 6 WIs. L. REv. 195, 211-12 (1931). See
also the statement of Justice Traynor to the effect that a recriminatory offense is often
concealed by agreement:
It bears noting how frequently divorces are uncontested. In many cases neither
spouse is "innocent," and yet by agreement, one of them defaults to ensure
a divorce. Thus a strict recrimination rule fails in its purpose of denying
relief to the guilty. Moreover, it exerts a corrupting influence on the nego-
tiations that precede the entry of such a default. The spouse who more des-
perately seeks an end to a hopeless union is penalized by the ability of the other
spouse to prevent a divorce through the assertion of a recriminatory defense,
and the more unscrupulous partner may obtain substantial financial concessions
as the price of remaining silent. DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 869,
250 P.2d 598, 604 (1952).
89 Feinsinger & Young, supra note 88, at 211-12.
90 Id. at 212.
91 Note, supra note 86, at 191. (Footnotes omitted.) For a comprehensive dis-
cussion of the living-apart statutes and an excellent outline of the individual state laws,
see Note, 1959 WASH. U.LQ. 189, 204-05.
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family together; (2) it serves as a check upon immorality; and (3)
it protects the property rights of the wife.92 The problem with
these social justifications is that they are based upon ideas of moral-
ity rather than upon reality, and consequently they are quite suscep-
tible to refutation. For instance, simple reasoning would indicate,
even to the casual observer that a marriage which has deteriorated
to the point of a bitter court contest over the right to a divorce will
not serve to hold the family together. Furthermore, instead of fos-
tering morality, recrimination by maintaining a lifeless marriage
encourages immorality, since those who cannot satisfy their needs
within the marital ties will seek to do so outside the marital rela-
tionship. Finally, to aver that recrimination protects the property
rights of the wife is an erroneous application of a fault concept to
an area where fault has no place. The public policy inherent in
protecting the property rights of the wife would be better served if
these rights were based not upon fault but on consideration of the
wealth and particular needs of the parties."
Absent these ill-conceived social justifications of recrimination,
there are other evils inherent in the doctrine. Recrimination re-
sults in default decrees (uncontested divorces) and encourages usur-
pation of the judicial function, for the only mutual fault cases which
reach court are those in which a litigant is forced to resort to re-
crimination because he failed to bargain successfully outside of
court. Moreover, recrimination is seldom invoked to preserve the
marriage; rather, it is used to adjust property rights or child custody
rights. 4 Finally, the emphasis is wrongly placed, in that recrimina-
tion considers fault and punishment to be of prime importance
rather than the fact that a problem exists which must be solved in
the best possible manner.95
9 2 Beamer, The Doctrine of Recrinination in Divorce Proceedings, 10 U. KAN.
CITY L. REV. 213, 249-56 (1942).
9 3 Note, supra note 91, at 200.
94 The anomaly of attempting to invoke recrimination to adjust property and cus-
tody rights, at least in Ohio, is strikingly illustrated. The courts have held that once a
divorce is denied, they have no jurisdiction to settle disputes over property disposition
or the custody of children. See, e.g., Cowgill v. Cowgill, 172 N.E.2d 721 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1960).
95 See generally Bradway, The Myth of the Innocent Spouse, 11 TuL. L. REv. 377,
382-87 (1937); Feinsinger & Young, supra note 88, at 211-12; Sherman, supra note
54, at 466; Note, 28 IowA L. REV. 341, 349 (1943).
Another flaw in the defense of recrimination is strikingly illustrated by the state-
ment that "Repudiation of the principle of recrimination would help eliminate the 'horse
trader's bargaining' of the lawyer's office and would permit emphasis upon the sociologi-
cal aspects of divorce problems." Ibid.
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IV. CONCLUSION
While the major focus of this Note has been on Ohio law' an
attempt has been made to outline generally both the ancient history
and the current status of the doctrine of recrimination as a defense
to divorce actions. The survey of Ohio law on the subject demon-
strates that the defense exists in its most pervasive and pernicious
form in this state. When a recriminatory offense is pleaded and
proven, it serves as an absolute bar to the granting of a divorce.
In the realities of modern society, recrimination has become
"logically absurd, sociologically abhorrent, [and] historically doubt-
ful."" Many legal scholars have vehemently urged its repudia-
tion, 7 but their arguments have not been persuasive with the courts
and legislatures. Inasmuch as rational alternatives to recrimination
are now available - comparative rectitude, judicial discretion, and
voluntary separation as a ground for divorce - it is a propitious
time to cast off the "binding shackles" 8 of the recrimination doc-
trine.
ABERDEEN P. HUTCHISON
96 Raskin & Katz, The Dying Doctrine of Recrimination in the United States of
America, 35 CAN. B. REV. 1046, 1059 (1957).
9 7 See authorities cited note 95 supra.
98 Raskin & Katz, supra note 96, at 1059.
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